PREDICTING CORPORATE TURNAROUND USING LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A RESEARCH ON BURSA MALAYSIA  COMPANIES by Abdullah, Tengku Mohammad Chairal & Hussin, Zolkafli
Manajemen & Bisnis, Volume 9, Nomor 2, September 2010 
 
214 
PREDICTING CORPORATE TURNAROUND USING LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A RESEARCH ON BURSA MALAYSIA 
COMPANIES 
 
Tengku Mohammad Chairal Abdullah 
Faculty of Economy, University of North Sumatera, email: tengku_chairal@yahoo.co.uk 
Zolkafli Hussin 
College of Business, Northern University of Malaysia, email: zolkafli@uum.edu.my 
 
Abstract 
There has been considerable research done by academicians and practitioners on corporate 
bankruptcy predictions, though in the field of corporate turnaround such research were somehow 
much lacking. Scholars argued that early acceptance of turnaround situation were important for 
successful recovery. Therefore early predictions on turnaround situation were much needed. 
This paper seeks to give an overview of corporate turnaround predictions. The samples were 
taken from the main board companies of Bursa Malaysia from the year 1997 to 2005. Data were 
taken from financial statement which being published in the Handbook of Annual Report. 
Several financial ratios were considered in the analysis to see whether a significant difference 
exists between Turnaround and Non-Turnaround firms. The research used Logistic Regression 
Analysis as statistical tool. The study found Financial Leverage Ratio (Total Debt/Total Asset), 
Sales/Total Asset, Receivables/Inventory and Total Tangible Asset to have statistical significant 
measure to differentiate between the two groups of companies. The study also found that those 
ratios could be use as significant predictor variables in measuring the probability of a particular 
company to fall under one of those categories. Hopefully the findings of the research would shed 
some light and give a better platform in predicting which company would enter the phase of 
turnaround situation. 
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Abstrak  
Para ahli berpendapat bahwa pengakuan keatas perlunya usaha-usaha penyehatan yang 
dilakukan sedini mungkin merupakan salah satu faktor penting dalam kesuksesan penyehatan 
perusahaan, sehingga peramalan tentang hal ini sangat diperlukan. Ini merupakan salah satu 
tujuan  utama dari artikel ini. Sampel penelitian adalah perusahaan yang dikategorikan dalam 
papan utama Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 1997 hingga 2005. Data diambil dari laporan keuangan 
yang dipublikasikan dalam The Handbook of Annual Report. Beberapa jenis rasio keuangan 
diperhitungkan dalam analisis ini untuk menentukan perbedaan yang nyata diantara perusahaan 
yang bermasalah dengan yang sehat. Penelitian ini yang menggunakan logistic regresi sebagai 
alat analisis. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa beberapa rasio keuangan diantaranya, rasio 
hutang (Hutang/ Asset), Omset/ Total Aset, Piutang/ Inventory dan Nilai Aset Nyata 
menunjukkan nilai statistik yang cukup signifikan membedakan antara perusahaan yang tidak 
sehat dan sehat. Penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa rasio-rasio tersebut juga bisa digunakan 
sebagai variable peramal dalam menentukan probabilitas sebuah perusahaan tergolong dalam 
kategori sehat maupun tidak sehat.  
 
Kata kunci: corporate turnaround, financial leverage, sales, receivables, inventory, asset 
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1. Research Background 
The body of knowledge in the field of corporate turnaround has grown tremendously over 
the last few decades (Chowdury, 2002). Although the research were still quite scarce within the 
setting of developing countries, the focus of scholars within the field of corporate turnaround 
were somewhat started to shift toward this region especially in East Asia after the last economic 
crisis of 1998 (see for e.g. Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan 2001, 2003). However, scholars agreed 
that corporate turnaround still produced very limited number of literature compared to other field 
of strategic management. The scarcity of the literature were argued due to the limited number of 
samples available, which is perhaps one of the reason for small number of samples (usually 
below 50) were generally accepted as sufficient in the research of corporate turnaround (see, for 
e.g. Barker III and Barr, 2002). 
Due to this limitation, some researchers used secondary data analysis, such as through 
historical data of financial statements in order to add up the number of sample in the study and to 
gain additional information from the research. There were many researchers (see for e.g. 
Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) who used financial ratios as measures to evaluate strategies taken by 
turning around companies. And since financial based performance measures such as Return on 
Sales (ROS), Return on Assets (ROA), Earning per Share (EPS) and Net Income, have been the 
dominant model in empirical strategy research (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986), its usage in the 
field of corporate turnaround has also been widely spread.    
The fact on the growing number of researches in the field of corporate turnaround 
especially on corporate turnaround strategies, were not evenly spread on other branches of the 
field. Literature has shown that research on the predictions of turnaround companies were very 
scarce if not limited. The usage of financial ratios which were useful on many researches on 
corporate turnaround, which also were found to be abundantly applied in the research of 
corporate bankruptcy or corporate collapse, were found to be in a very limited application in this 
particular section of corporate turnaround.   
 
1.1. Severeness and Early Detection 
Sense of severity on turnaround situation was introduced by Hofer (1980) in the early 80s 
as one of the contextual factor that might influence the turnaround outcome. Hofer (1980) was 
also perhaps one of the earliest scholars in corporate turnaround who suggested the linkage 
between the severeness of turnaround situation and appropriate selection of turnaround 
strategies. In this sense Hofer (1980), which supported by Goodman (1982), argued that there 
was a definite urgency of realizing the fact that particular troubled companies were in-need-of 
turnaround as soon as possible to have better chances of turning around successfully. This 
proposition was supported by later scholars who argued that major denial in the existence of the 
crisis faced by troubled companies, remained as major obstacle towards recovery (Goodard, 
1993; Slatter, 1984).      
The above arguments lead to a suggestion that a timely acceptance of the fact that a 
company is in-need of turnaround effort was perhaps one of the few important ingredients for a 
successful recovery. The earlier a troubled company realizing the fact that it needs a turnaround, 
the better its chances of having successful recovery, since the problems that had to be tackled 
would not be so heavy and changes in the economy would arguably still be within the expected 
condition, hence a troubled company would have better time to prepare itself even if crisis were 
coming.  
Review on the literature of corporate bankruptcy showed that there are characteristics that 
differentiate between bankrupt companies and healthy companies, which usually shown through 
few important measures of financial ratios (see for e.g. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968). These 
financial ratios which argued to depict the internal condition of companies could also be used as 
differentiating characteristics which categorized companies as in-need-of-turnaround and non-
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turnaround few years earlier before the troubled companies really face turnaround situation.  And 
if such signs do exist, it could also be used as predictors of turnaround situation and warn the 
expected companies of the impending crisis situation few years even before the troubled 
companies realized that they would face the troubled situation of in-need-of turn around. 
 
1.2. The Objective 
Earlier scholars in the field of corporate turnaround argued that the dominant factor which 
caused many companies to be in the situation of financial distress were generated internally 
(Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 1984; Argenti, 1976; Schendel et al., 1976; Nueno, 1993; Gooddard, 
1993; Goodman, 1982). Although many managers blamed the external condition such as 
economic crisis or unpredicted movement of commodity price (Slatter, 1984) as the triggering 
factor, scholars argued that financially distressed companies were already facing internal 
difficulties prior to the crisis. Those companies were simply did not feel it since the contraction 
of economy was not really being felt prior to the crisis. During this time, financially distressed 
companies usually experiencing a normal-happy time with moderate growth compared to other 
companies in the industry, since the economy was still booming and some industries were 
prospering. 
In the event that crisis hit the economy and contraction to the economy was beginning to 
happen rapidly, these troubled companies would find themselves suddenly in the brink of 
bankruptcy. It was at this time that their covered-internal problems were revealed and the 
company found itself in a financially distressed situation (Bibeault, 1982). Therefore it is argued 
that if a turnaround company were already facing internal problems prior to the situation in 
which it needed a turnaround, those problems should have been projected in its key financial 
ratios. This means that its financial ratios should have shown some differences compared to a 
healthy non-distressed companies prior to the crisis stage. 
It is the objective of the paper to see whether there are significant differences in the aspect 
of internal financial condition (depicted by several financial ratios) between in-need-of-
turnaround companies and non-turnaround companies, which were listed on the Main Board of 
Bursa Malaysia from 1997 to 2005. The secondary objective of the paper is to investigate 
whether those financial ratios could be use as tools to predict whether a particular company 
would be experiencing turnaround situation in the near future.      
This paper will be presented in five parts. Introduction and Literature Review will give an 
overview on the background of the study and overview of the research being done in the field of 
corporate bankruptcy. The section of Research Method will elaborate on samples and procedures 
used in the study. The Findings section will show the results from the statistical analysis. And 
finally the discussion and implication section will close the arguments presented in this paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Review from the literature suggested that the symptoms of decline has shown itself much 
in the early days of the downturn period, however management did not really see or purposely 
ignored it and did not do anything about it, which in turn caused the company to continue its 
deterioration from bad to worst (Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 1984; Nueno, 1993).  This management 
attitude of crisis denial as argued by Goddard (1993), prolong the deterioration faced by 
companies. There fore early detection and acceptance of the crisis is needed in troubled 
companies. This argument was further supported by Goodman (1982) who argued that one of the 
common things that turnaround winner had is the early recognition of the need for a turnaround 
posture. 
Early recognition of the need of turnaround lead to the understanding that the problems are 
still not serious or severe enough so that the problematic company still can handle it with 
significant resources, in which at that time they would still had. Meaning to say, the turnaround 
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company would have a better chance of survival if that company detect its problems early and 
try to solve it immediately, while it still has the resources to do so. Literature suggested that 
decline of a company depicted in several different kinds of symptoms (Bibeault, 1982; Slatter, 
1984; Nueno, 1993; Goodman, 1982). Basically, these symptoms of companies in trouble can be 
categorized into four types: (a). Symptoms from Financial Statement, This type of symptoms 
includes decreasing profitability (margins), decreasing sales volume at constant price, declining 
market share, increase in debt, decreasing liquidity, restricted dividend policy, delays in 
publishing annual report and also changes of auditors (see for e.g. Barker and Mone, 1994; 
Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003; Chowdury and Lang, 1996). (b). Symptoms from 
Mathematical Forecasting Signals, This symptoms mostly in the form of ratio analysis that were 
used to predict banckruptcy, such as done by Altman (1968), Beaver (1966), Edmister (1972), 
Meyer and Pifer (1970), Tamari (1966), Trieschmann and Pinches (1973), Wilcox (1971), 
Pinches et al., (1975), Casey et al., (1986), Chen and Shimerda (1981), Moyer (1977), Lau 
(1987), Taffler and Tishaw (1977), Makeever (1984), Laitinen and Laitinen (2000), Hossari and 
Rahman (2005) and many others. (c). 
This type of symptoms can be found in many forms, such as: rapid management turnover 
(loss of key managers), lack of planning/ strategic thinking, loss of productivity, little self-
criticism (fear of top management), regularly missing plan, poor communication between 
functional divisions, meeting as an avoidance technique, little delegation and lack of bold action 
(Slatter, 1984; Goldstein, 1995). And (d) Symptoms from the Stakeholders, Such symptoms 
includes decline in quality or service for the customer, price cuts, tightening credit policy, 
increase in non-payer customer, outdated products, increasing complaints from the customer, 
reduced size of order to the supplier, experiencing unusual low inventory on stocks or materials, 
taking longer time to pay suppliers which caused reticence among them, greater resistance to 
increase pay to the employees, cuts in overtime, less generous treatment to the employee which 
eventually increased labour hostility, delays in capital expenditure authorization and resistance in 
the financial community (Slatter, 1984; Goldstein, 1995; Goddard, 1993). 
Although these classifications of symptom are definitely not the cause of decline, it is 
through these symptoms that the management, investors or even stakeholders could see that there 
is definitely something wrong happening within the troubled company. And perhaps among 
these classifications of symptoms, the analyses of financial ratios were the most published in the 
literature since the information needed were the most publicly available through the companies’ 
published financial report. Ratio analysis had undergone rigorous studies especially during 
1970s. Many of those researchs were in favor of knowing the differences or characteristics that 
differentiate a particular group of companies to another. For example, the analysis of 
characteristics of merged firms (Stevens, 1973 and Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971), prediction of 
corporate bond rating (Horrigan, 1966; Pinches and Mingo, 1973; Pogue and Soldofsky, 1969; 
and West, 1970), and particularly in the field of corporate bankruptcy prediction (Altman, 1968; 
Beaver, 1966; Edmister, 1972; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Tamari, 1966; Trieschmann and Pinches, 
1973; Wilcox, 1971; Pinches et al., 1975; Casey et al., 1986; Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Moyer, 
1977; Lau, 1987; Taffler and Tisshaw, 1977; Makeever, 1984; Hossari and Rahman, 2005; and 
many other studies). However most of the studies mentioned above which were mainly in the 
field of corporate bankruptcy prediction, focused on the difference of internal condition (as 
described by its ratio analysis) between bankrupt firms (or firms filing for bankruptcy) and 
healthy firms. It is very rare to find a research that compared the internal condition of turnaround 
and non-turnaround companies, one or two years before the turnaround firms entered a 
turnaround phase or undertaking turnaround efforts. 
Over the years as much as 65 accounting ratios were used to predict corporate bankruptcy 
(Chen and Shimerda, 1981). There were more than 20 studies on corporate bankruptcy prediction 
and each study tend to produced its own ratio, which apparently about 40 of them were found to 
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be quite significant. Chen and Shimerda (1981) further argued that all of those 40 ratios cannot 
be equally important in multi ratio model, and further more too many ratios would confuse the 
user. Pinches et al., (1975) examined 48 ratios of 221 industrial firms and found that 92% of the 
common variation among those 48 financial ratios can be explained and grouped into seven 
classifications of financial ratios. Pinches et al., (1975) argued that by taking each ratio, which 
has high factor loading in each of the seven groups, can describe almost as good as all the 48 
ratios combined. The seven classification of financial ratios found by Pinches et al., (1975) is 
shown on Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Seven Major Classification of Financial Ratios  
Group of Financial 
Ratios 




Return on Investment Total income/ total capital 
Net income/ net worth 
0.97 
0.96 
Capital Turnover Sales/ net plant 
Sales/ total asset 
0.95 
0.89 
Inventory Turnover Inventory/ sales 
Cost of goods sold/ inventory 
0.97 
-0.97 
Financial Leverage Debt/ total capital 
Debt/ total asset 
0.99 
0.97 




Short-term Liquidity Current asset/ current liability 
Quick asset/ current liability 
0.91 
0.81 
Cash Position Cash/ total asset 




There were several other researchs synthesizing financial ratios as model for corporate 
bankruptcy. A research by Laitinen and Laitinen (2000) took a sample of 32 financial ratios 
based on its specific usefulness to develop a model on corporate collapse. Another recent article 
done by Hossari and Rahman (2005), collected 48 financial ratios out of 53 studies and ranked 
them according to their popularity. They found only five (which includes Net Income/Total 
Asset, Current Asset/Current Liability, Total Liability/Total Asset, Working Capital/Total Asset 
and Earning Before Interest and Taxes/Total Asset) out of those 48 ratios were found to be 
useful by more than 25% of the 53 studies.  
In Malaysian context, only one research was found in regards to corporate bankruptcy 
prediction, which was done by Bidin (1988). The model was developed only for the evaluations 
of performance of the government owned companies. Bidin’s model was developed based on 
widely cited and loosely used model developed earlier by Altman (1968). The weaknesses of 
Altman model, as Moyer (1977) argued, the model was sensitive to the time span that were used 
to develop the model and also to the size of the firm in the sample group. This limitation was 
also argued to limit the interpretation of the Bidin’s findings, as it was quite old and might no 
longer applicable in the current business setting. The same limitation on using financial ratios as 
prediction tools on corporate bankruptcy, might also has some effect as well in the field of 
corporate turnaround. This consideration has to be taken into account especially during the 
interpretations of the results, as we would find in later section of the article. 
 
3. Research Method   
This article focused on 96 companies that were listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia 
Stock Exchange. Previously Bursa Malaysia was known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange until 
it changed its name at 2005. The list of companies was obtained from the Annual Report of 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange volume 23, which was publicized by Bursa Malaysia. It contains 
compilation of limited financial statement data from all the companies which were listed in the 
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stock exchange.  A turnaround company in this study is defined as companies who experienced 
massive decline in Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) more than 80% in a single year. 
The extreme definition is applied to characterize the threat to organization’s life-existence which 
differentiates corporate turnaround from other field of organizational change. This definition was 
previously also used by Bibeault (1982) to defined turnaround sample in his study. A company 
which fall under the above definition would then be marked as Turnaround Company, and the 
year of which its financial statement categorized it as Turnaround Company would then be used 
as the base year for the research. The data acquired for year -1 and year -2 were obtained from 
the previous reported financial statement data (reported financial statement 1-accounting period 
and 2-accounting period before) for the same company. The EBIT data were compiled from the 
year of 1997 to 2005, in order to include some external effects of financial crisis in 1998.  
All of the sectors in the main board of Bursa Malaysia were included in the analysis except 
companies under trust and financial sector. These were omitted from the study since companies 
listed under these sectors had different financial structure. Since this research was developed as 
part of two studies, only companies whose financial statement were reported in the year of 1995 
and 1996 on the handbook were considered to be in the population. This measure was also taken 
in the consideration to assure the availability of data year -1 and year -2, as well as to sterilize 
the sample group from the subsequent listing of additional companies in the stock exchange after 
the financial crisis of 1998. The financial crisis of 1998 is considered to be the external event 
that triggers the turnaround situation, which would act as the base argument that the turnaround 
companies would be financially different internally compared to the healthy companies even 
before the crisis struck in 1998. From the initial population of 385 companies, 48 companies 
were found to be in the turnaround (TA) group. The group of Non-Turnaround (NTA) companies 
was selected by using proportionate systematic random sampling, which produced another 48 
companies to represent the group.  
Several financial ratios, which proposed earlier by Pinches et al., (1975) were included in 
the analysis, such as Sales/Total Asset (S/TA), Inventory/Sales, Total Debt/Total Asset (TD/TA), 
Receivables/Inventory (R/Inv), Current Asset/Current Liability (CA/CL), and Cash/Total Asset 
(C/TA). The ratio of Total Net Income/Total Capital (ROI) was omitted due to unavailable data. 
A ratio proposed by Altman et al., (1977) in their Zeta Analysis, which is Size (Total Tangible 
Asset - TTA) was also included in the analysis. During data screening, the ratio of 
Inventory/Sales was found to be not normally distributed although few techniques of data 
transformation and deletion of outliers applied to the variable. Hence the variable was dropped 
from further analysis. In conclusion, the proposed model of logistic regression can be postulated 
in the equation below: 
  
DV =   e α + βn IVn + ε   , whereby 
 1 + e 
α + βn IVn + ε
 
 
DV:  Dependent variable, the probability that the outcome of such observation would 
be in turnaround or non-turnaround 
α   : The constant-only model 
IV : Independent Variable, Sales/Total Asset (STA, year -1 and -2), Total Debt/ Total 
Asset (TD/TA, year -1 and -2), Receivables/Inventory (R/Inv, year -1 and -2), 
Current Asset/ Current Liability (CA/CL, year -1 and -2), Cash/ Total Asset 
(C/TA, year -1 and -2), Total Tangible Asset (TTA, year -1 and -2) 
 
There are basically four models which proposed to be tested: 
a. Constant-only Model ; whereby the equation consist only a constant variable 
b. Single Model : whereby each ratio will be treated separately as each individual model 
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c. Full Model : whereby all of the ratios will be treated in a single equation 
d. Incomplete Model : whereby the equation consist of only several ratios (R/Inv -1, 
CA/CL -1, CA/CL -2, C/TA -1 and C/TA -2) 
e. Adjusted Model : whereby the equation consist of Incomplete Model and several 
additional ratios (S/TA -1, S/TA -2 and TTA -2) 
 
It is important to compare all of these models in the effort to find the best predictor 
variables within the model. As Tabachnick and Fiddel (2007) argued that one of the best way to 
find significant predictor in Logistic Regression is to find the variables which contribute 
significantly towards the difference of the tested model with the constant-only model. 
It was hypothesized that the internal condition of Turnaround companies should be 
different compared to Non-Turnaround companies one or two years before TA companies were 
classified as in-need-of turnaround. Therefore the ratio analysis, which depicted the internal 
condition of the firm, should show some differences between the two groups. Furthermore it was 
argued that if such differences of financial ratios existed between TA and NTA group, those 
financial ratios might be used to predict the probability of such company fall into one of the two 
categories. 
The appropriate statistical analyses for this kind of test are discriminant analysis and 
logistic regression. However logistic regression were chosen for the study as the appropriate 
technique due to its flexibility on the multivariate assumptions, which had to be met in full if the 
analysis of discriminant were being used (Hair et al., 1998). In logistic regression, variables of 
predictor do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related or having equal variance within 
each group (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007). It is a technique which emphasizes the probability of a 
particular outcome for each case being tested.  
 
4. Result and Discussion 
A direct logistic regression analysis was performed on each financial ratio by treating them 
as individual variable. The result on Wald test (Table 2) shows statistical significance on variable 
TD/TA -1 and TTA -1, with value of Exp (B) of 2.655 and 0.711 respectively. However as 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) suggested that comparison of models with predictors and without 
predictors were considered to be much superior technique compared by only using the Wald test 
alone. Therefore comparisons of models with predictors of single variable against a constant-
only model were also performed as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 2. Statistical Results on Each Financial Ratio Treated as Single Variable  
Showing Wald Statistic and Exponential Beta 
Variable Constant B S.E. Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
S/TA -1 -0.457 -.0468 0.240 3.822 1 0.051 0.626 
S/TA -2 -0.314 -0.337 0.240 1.971 1 0.160 0.714 
TD/TA -1 0.856 0.977 0.394 6.158 1 0.013* 2.655* 
TD/TA -2 0.651 0.648 0.348 3.457 1 0.063 1.911 
R/Inv -1 0.027 -0.113 0.125 0.809 1 0.368 0.893 
R/Inv -2 0.022 0.075 0.144 0.271 1 0.603 1.078 
CA/CL -1 0.102 -0.441 0.292 2.281 1 0.131 0.644 
CA/CL -2 0.135 -0.680 0.392 2.998 1 0.083 0.507 
C/TA -1 -0.968 -0.325 0.170 3.662 1 0.056 0.723 
C/TA -2 -0.863 -0.282 0.160 3.107 1 0.078 0.755 
TTA -1 4.146 -0.340 0.170 4.006 1 0.045* 0.711* 
TTA -2 2.617 -0.220 0.153 2.064 1 0.151 0.802 
 Notes: * Significant 5% 
 
The findings based on the comparison of the single model with constant-only model are 
depicted in Table 3. There are several variables which produced significant results (supporting 
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the findings by using Wald test) such as S/TA -1 (p: 0.044), TTA -1 (p: 0.036), TD/TA -1 (p: 
0.008) and TD/TA -2 (p: 0.047). However the variance accounted for each of  these variables are 
small, as showed by the small value of Nagelkerke R
2
 (0.055 for S/TA -1, 0.063 for TTA -1, 
0.094 for TA/TD -1 and 0.054 for TA/TD -2).  
 
Table 3. Statistical Results on Each Financial Ratio Treated as Single Variable  














 df Sig 
S/TA -1 133.084 129.014 4.07 1 0.044* 0.042 0.055 
S/TA -2 130.269 128.220 2.05 1 0.152 0.022 0.029 
TD/TA -1 133.084 126.028 7.06 1 0.008* 0.071 0.094 
TD/TA -2 133.084 129.149 3.94 1 0.047* 0.040 0.054 
R/Inv -1 128.915 128.089 0.826 1 0.364 0.009 0.012 
R/Inv -2 128.915 128.642 0.272 1 0.602 0.003 0.004 
CA/CL -1 133.084 130.684 2.4 1 0.121 0.025 0.033 
CA/CL -2 127.496 124.293 3.20 1 0.074 0.034 0.046 
C/TA -1 130.312 126.472 3.84 1 0.051 0.040 0.053 
C/TA -2 131.687 128.433 3.25 1 0.071 0.034 0.045 
TTA -1 125.878 121.504 4.37 1 0.036* 0.047 0.063 
TTA -2 127.365 125.215 2.15 1 0.143 0.023 0.031 
Notes: * Significant 5% 
 
Table 4 shows the predicted accuracy of using single financial ratio as variable in 
predicting turnaround and non-turnaround firms. As shown in the table, the ratio of TD/TA -1 
was found to be a better predictor of in-need-of turnaround companies as it shows 70.8% of 
correct predictions, which is much better compared to any other single variables. The data shown 
in table 2 also support these arguments, as the odds ratios which measured by Exp(B) also shows 
big effect (2.655 for TD/TA -1 and 1.911 for TD/TA -2) especially for the ratio of Total Debt/ 
Total Asset compared to other variables. This value explains that 1-point increase in the ratio of 
TD/TA, would increase the probability of a company to fall under the category of turnaround by 
2.65 for TD/TA -1 and 1.91 for TD/TA -2 respectively.  
 
Table 4. Statistical results on the Predictive Accuracy of Using 
Single Financial Ratios as Single Variable 
Variable Observed Overall % of Correct 
Prediction 
Predicted 
NTA TA % Correct 
S/TA -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 61.5 30 18 62.5 
Turnaround (TA) 19 29 60.4 
S/TA -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 59.6 33 15 68.8 
Turnaround (TA) 23 23 50 
TD/TA -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 61.5 25 23 52.1 
Turnaround (TA) 14 34 70.8 
TD/TA -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 63.5 29 19 60.4 
Turnaround (TA) 16 32 66.7 
R/Inv -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 50.5 18 28 39.1 
Turnaround (TA) 18 29 61.7 
R/Inv -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 49.5 17 29 37 
Turnaround (TA) 18 29 61.7 
CA/CL -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 59.4 27 21 56.3 
Turnaround (TA) 18 30 62.5 
CA/CL -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 63 33 14 70.2 
Turnaround (TA) 20 25 55.6 
C/TA -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 57.4 27 20 57.4 
Turnaround (TA) 20 27 57.4 
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Table 4, Continued... 
C/TA -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 53.7 28 20 58.3 
Turnaround (TA) 24 23 48.9 
TTA -1 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 58.2 20 23 46.5 
Turnaround (TA) 15 33 68.8 
TTA -2 Non – Turnaround (NTA) 58.7 22 22 50 
 Turnaround (TA)  16 32 66.7 
 
A direct logistic regression was also performed with all predictor variables simultaneously 
in the full model as shown in Table 5. Although none of the variables seem to have significant 
statistical result as viewed from Wald test in Table 5, some variables however showed some kind 
of significant effect size from the value produced in Exp(B).  
These variables include S/TA -2 (1.413), TD/TA -1 (6.553), TD/TA -2 (1.313), R/Inv -2 
(1.590), and TTA -2 (2.543). To test further on whether these variables have a significant effect 
size toward the regression model, a separate model was developed to compare it with the full 
predictors’ model. An incomplete model of logistic regression consisted of R/Inv -1, CA/CL -1, 
CA/CL -2, C/TA -1 and C/TA -2 as predictor variables were then tested and compared firstly 
with the constant-only model (see Table 6). The result showed that there is no significant 
improvement of the incomplete model compared to constant-only model (sig : .353 ; p>.05). 
Therefore the incomplete model can be said as having no differences with the constant-only 
model. 
 
Table 5. Statistical Results of the Full Model with All Predictors 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
S/TA -1 -1.281 0.832 2.371 1 0.124 0.278* 
S/TA -2 0.346 0.791 0.191 1 0.662 1.413* 
TD/TA -1 1.880 1.272 2.186 1 0.139 6.553* 
TD/TA -2 0.272 1.186 0.053 1 0.818 1.313* 
R/Inv -1 -0.234 0.294 0.630 1 0.427 0.792 
R/Inv -2 0.464 0.321 2.081 1 0.149 1.590* 
CA/CL -1 0.172 0.737 0.054 1 0.816 1.187 
CA/CL -2 0.160 0.847 0.036 1 0.850 1.174 
C/TA -1 0.056 0.332 0.028 1 0.867 1.057 
C/TA -2 -0.157 0.266 0.349 1 0.555 0.855 
TTA -1 -1.257 0.787 2.549 1 0.110 0.284* 
TTA -2 0.934 0.795 1.378 1 0.240 2.543* 
Constant 4.710 2.998 2.469 1 0.116 111.095 
 
The Incomplete Model then were added several predictor variable (S/TA -1, S/TA -2, 
TD/TA -1, TD/TA -2, R/Inv -2, TTA -1, TTA -2) individually and compared with the original 
Incomplete Model. The results (see Table 6) clearly showed that out of seven predictor variables 
which argued to have significant effect on the full model, only four (TD/TA -1, TD/TA -2, R/Inv 
-2 and TTA -1) have a clear significant effect towards enhancing the probability of the logistic 
regression function. 
Another model which is called as the Adjusted Model, which consists of predictor 
variables initially included in the Incomplete Model plus three other predictor variables (S/TA -
1, S/TA -2 and TTA -2) was tested and compared with the initial Incomplete Model. The result 
showed that there is no significant difference between these two models, which mean that the 
additional three predictor variables were failed to enhance the predictive power of the logistic 
regression. Even if the Adjusted Model were tested against the constant-only model, there is no 
significant difference between the two models (Chi
2
: 10.6, df: 8, p> 0.05). Hence the predictive 
value of the Adjusted Model did not differ significantly compared to constant-only model. 
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 df Sig 
Constant-only 115.048 120.596 5.55 5 0.353 0.062 0.082 
S/TA -1 115.048 113.087 1.96 1 p >0.05 0.083 0.110 
S/TA -2 115.048 113.993 1.06 1 p >0.05 0.073 0.097 
TD/TA -1 115.048 108.091 6.96 1 p < 0.01* 0.134 0.179 
TD/TA -2 115.048 108.627 6.42 1 p <0.05* 0.129 0.171 
R/Inv -2 115.048 110.274 4.77 1 p < 0.05* 0.112 0.149 
TTA -1 115.048 110.267 4.78 1 p < 0.05* 0.085 0.113 
TTA -2 115.048 112.772 2.28 1 p >0.05 0.072 0.096 
Adjusted M
(b)
 115.048 109.969 5.08 3 p >0.05 0.102 0.136 
Full Model 109.969 91.836 18.13 4 p < 0.005* 0.263 0.351 
      (a) Incomplete Model consist of R/Inv -1, CA/CL -1, CA/CL -2, C/TA -1 and C/TA -2 as predictor variables 
         (b) Adjusted Model consist of R/Inv -1, CA/CL -1, CA/CL -2, C/TA -1, C/TA -2, S/TA -1, S/TA -2 and TTA -2  
  
However if a comparison was made between the Full Model and the Adjusted Model, there 
is a clear statistical significance between these models. There is a vivid contribution of the four 
predictor variables (TD/TA -1, TD/TA -2, R/Inv -2 and TTA -1) towards enhancing the overall 
probability model of logistic regression, as shown by the Exp (B) for each predictors’ variables 
(see Table 5). The most extreme value of variable was produced by TD/TA -1, which showed an 
Exp(B) value of 6.553, which means that one value of increase in the variable would increase the 
odds of a company to fall under the category of turnaround as much as six times. 
 
Table 7. Statistical Results of the Logistic Regression Model  
with Predictive Accuracy 
Model Observed Predicted 
NTA TA % Correct 
Incomplete Non – Turnaround (NTA) 26 18 59.1 
Turnaround (TA) 17 26 60.5 
Overall %   59.8 
Adjusted Non – Turnaround (NTA) 27 16 62.8 
Turnaround (TA) 17 26 60.5 
Overall %   61.6 
Full Non – Turnaround (NTA) 30 12 71.4 
Turnaround (TA) 11 32 74.4 
Overall %   72.9 
 
However the variance accounted for the combination effect of all variables are still small 
(Nagelkerke R
2
 0.351), although the figure were much improved compared to Nagelkerke R
2
 of 
individual variable or even from the Adjusted Model (Nagelkerke R
2
 0.136). The predictive 
accuracy of the full model was also increased by the inclusion of the four predictors’ variables as 
shown in Table 7. The statement that predictive accuracy of the observed company would fall 
under turnaround category has improved almost as much as 15% in the full model compared to 
other models.  
From the findings discussed above, it can be seen that there is a significant difference in 
the aspect of internal condition between Turnaround and Non-Turnaround firms. Although not 
all of the financial ratios showed a significant difference, several financial ratios (S/TA -1, 
TD/TA -1, TD/TA -2 and TTA -1) which have been tested individually, have showed that 
statistically significant difference exist between TA and NTA firms. Multiple/ simultaneous 
effect of financial ratios also showed almost similar result, where ratios such as TD/TA -1, 
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TD/TA -2, R/Inv -2 and TTA -1 showed significant differences between these two different 
group of companies.  
Further analysis also shows that there is a predictive ability of these financial ratios to 
categorize between TA and NTA groups. In terms of individual ratio, financial leverage year -1 
(TD/TA -1) produced quite outstanding result with p 0.008 and Exp(B) of 2.655 , although the 
variance accounted for this ratio is quite small (Nagelkerke R
2
 0.094). In terms of multiple 
effects, the four ratios (S/TA -1, TD/TA -1, TD/TA -2 and TTA -1) produced significant 
enhancement of predictive ability towards the probability of logistic regression equation, with 
total prediction accuracy of 74.4%.  
The dominant predictive value of Financial Leverage ratio (Total Debt/Total Asset) in the 
analysis was perhaps due to the heavy leverage capital structure which was adopted by many 
troubled companies in the sample, prior to the year of the crisis. During the golden years of 
economic development in the South East Asian region, debt financing has become one of the 
major sources of funding for companies in the region. The availability of cheap financial 
resources with nearly unlimited amount of money fueled the economy with funding for public 
and private companies for aggressive investments (Sim, 2009), which mainly through debt 
financing. There fore it would not be surprising to see the ratio of Financial Leverage to be one 
of the important factors in predicting such companies to be in Turnaround or Non-Turnaround 
group.  
Studies by using financial ratios were mainly done in the field of corporate bankruptcy 
prediction. Studies using financial ratios in the literature of corporate turnaround were found to 
be quite rare especially in predicting corporate turnaround. There are several contributions that 
this study has managed to offer. Based on the time span of this research, this study showed that 
the internal conditions of the firm which involved in the study were somewhat different between 
turnaround and non-turnaround companies one year prior to the crisis year. This study also 
showed that the biggest differentiating factor between the two groups were the financial leverage 
ratios, which measured by the Total Debt/Total Asset. This ratio also acted as the most important 
variable since it produced the biggest predictive effect compared to other variables in the 
equation. This finding also suggest that perhaps the amount of debt that a company decided to 
handle, could be one of the decisive factor that might force a particular company to succumb into 
the region of turnaround.  
This study researched on 96 companies which were listed in the main board of Bursa 
Malaysia between the periods of 1997 to 2005. The study tried to differentiate in the aspect of 
internal condition of the TA and NTA companies by using financial ratio analyses. The study 
also tried to use the financial ratios to predict the probability of an observed company to fall 
under one of these two groups. In the analysis of single variable, the ratio of Sales/Total Asset 
(year -1), Total Debt/Total Asset (year -1 and -2) and Total Tangible Asset (year -1) were found 
to be quite significant statistically, to differentiate between the two groups. In the analysis of 
multiple variables, the ratios of Total Debt/Total Asset (year -1 and -2), Receivables/Inventory 
(year -2) and Total Tangible Asset (year -1) were found to contribute significantly to predict the 
probability of the logistic regression equation. 
However in light of future studies, whether such characteristics transcend to other 
companies listed in other Stock Exchange remains to be seen. In overall, these findings have 
strengthened the argument that the internal condition of a firm also played quite important roles 
in sending the company to the situation of turnaround, as previously argued by many scholars in 
the field. Thus the factor that caused the turnaround plunge does not necessarily come solely 
from the external factor as argued previously by many managers of troubled companies. 
Although the findings of the research were quite enticing, researchers still have to take 
precautions in reading the results. Since the assumptions which usually hold multivariate 
analysis were much more flexible in logistic regression, the results should be read with caution 
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especially when the assumptions of normality were relaxed. As with other researches on 
financial ratios, the results were argued to be sensitive to the time span of the sample data (see 
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